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INTRODUCTION 
For centuries both philosophers of science and 
scientists have challenged the use of metaphor in 
scientific discourse (Hoffman, 1980a,b), but a close 
look at this discourse reveals metaphor as a vital and 
necessary tool in developing scientific terminologies 
and hypotheses. 
I will begin my examination of metaphor in 
scientific discourse, with definitions: Simply put, 
metaphor is an implicit analogy of two unlike things. 
I.A. Richards (1936) refers to these two unlike parts 
of the metaphor as the "tenor," the primary subject, or 
the thing being described, and the "vehicle," which is 
the secondary subject or what the primary subject is 
being compared with. For example, in the metaphor "the 
moon is a pumpkin," moon is the tenor (primary 
subject), and pumpkin is the vehicle (secondary 
subject). 
Then, "what is scientific discourse?" James 
Kinneavy provides a definition in terms of discourse 
based on its referential "aim" (1971) in the study of 
scientific principles. In discussing referential 
discourse, Kinneavy identifies three types: 
informational, exploratory, and scientific. 
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Informational discourse presents a comprehensive 
discussion of a subject. Exploratory discourse 
explores a problem and tentative solutions or an issue 
and possible beliefs entailed in a subject. Scientific 
discourse posits and supports, either inductively or 
deductively, a hypothesis about a subject. My focus is 
on scientific writing, although what I consider can be 
applied to informative and exploratory discourse as 
well. 
Each type of referential discourse has its own 
style, but the stylistic features of scientific, 
informative, and exploratory discourse have strong 
similarities. According to Kinneavy, "'Objectivity' is 
the great virtue of scientific style." Most of the 
semantic and grammatical properties of this style, in 
fact, stem from the "objectivity of science, the 
attempt to reproduce reality as accurately as 
possible." Referential discourse as a whole is 
"reality-dominated," and features a "plain" style. 
Metaphor, however, has traditionally been 
associated with what Kinneavy terms the "literary aim" 
in which language calls attention to itself, an aim in 
apparent opposition to that of referential discourse. 
Because the goal of the scientific researcher is to 
approach truth by developing accurate hypotheses and 
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verifiable results in terms of objective reality, the 
language used in science must be clear and easy to 
interpret. There fore f igura ti ve language, including 
metaphor, has been eschewed in theory by many 
philosophers of science, even though in practice 
scientists themselves often use metaphor in their 
writing. As noted by Richard Honeck and Robert Hoffman 
(1980), Aristotle deplored figurative language as 
unnecessary and in opposition to objectivity. And 
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Bentham all subscribed to 
Bacon's assessment of metaphor as one of the "fantasies 
of the marketplace." In a sea thing condemnation of 
figurative language, John Locke (1706) asserted 
if we would speak of things as they are, 
we must allow that ••• all the 
artificial and figurative application of 
words eloquence hath invented, are for 
nothing else but to insinuate wrong 
ideas, move the passions, and thereby 
mislead the judgment: and so indeed are 
perfect cheats: and therefore, however 
laudable or allowable oratory may render 
them in harangues and popular addresses, 
they are certainly, in all discourses 
that pretend to inform or instruct, 
wholly to be avoided; and where truth and 
knowledge are concerned, cannot but be 
though a great fault, either of the 
language or person that makes use of them 
(III.x.34). 
And c. c. Anderson (1964, cited in Hoffman, 1980a) 
writes that in the modern age, as scientific and 
technical advances were made, metaphor was "classified 
-------···------ ----------·· 
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as an embellishment designed to dupe the unwary." 
This paper challenges the long-standing 
philosophical objections to using figurative language 
in referential discourse. Specifically, it posits 
theoretical justifications for using metaphor in 
scientific writing, addresses lingering concerns 
regarding the use of metaphor, and then examines a 
select body of scientific writing to evidence and 
characterize the place of metaphor in such discourse. 
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THE FUNCTIONS OF METAPHOR IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE 
Despite the allegations against figurative 
language, metaphor is helpful, at times essential, in 
performing three functions: establishing 
terminologies, expressing abstract concepts, and 
developing hypotheses. 
Metaphor in Scientific Terminology 
Metaphor's role in scientific terminology has been 
a particular concern of philosopher Richard Boyd. 
According to Boyd, metaphor can perform the vital 
catachretic function of developing terminology where 
none before existed (Boyd, 1979). 
In many cases, when fulfilling a catachretic 
function, metaphor may be considered from the 
traditional substitutional rather than interactive 
view. The substitution view, handed down from 
Aristotle, is that metaphor is no more than a 
comparison of two things, presenting a concept which 
could also be stated in literal terms. It states that 
A is B, or, for example, "my brother is a rock." 
A subdivision of the substitution view is the 
"comparison" view that metaphor is nothing more than an 
elliptic simile (Johnson, 1980). It states that A is 
like B in X respect, or, for example, "my brother is 
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like a rock in that both are firm and stable." 
Boyd (1979) presents two examples of metaphor used 
in this way to develop scientific terminology: 
1) there are "wormholes" in general relativity, and 
2) bound electrons appear in "electron clouds." 
Of course, these statements could be made in literal 
terms. For example, we could say that there are 
undefined elements in the theory of general relativity. 
This shows why the substitution view of metaphor may be 
at least partly responsible for the belief that it is 
merely ornamental and is primarily appropriate to 
poetry, where it fulfills an emotionally pleasing or 
descriptive role. 
But in some cases of catachresis, metaphor must be 
considered from the interactive perspective. The 
interactive view, established by Max Black and based on 
ideas from Richards, presents the idea that when the 
tenor and vehicle are compared, an "interaction" 
between the two takes place within the minds of the 
speaker and hearer. The speaker and hearer select and 
emphasize certain characteristics of both subjects, 
creating a new view of one or both of them. Metaphor 
then expresses something which may not be as aptly 
expressed in literal terms, and in fact may be not at 
all expressable in any other terms. In this instance 
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one topic is seen through the "filter" of another: A is 
seen through the filter of B. Viewing my brother 
through the "rock filter" I pick out the 
characteristics a rock has that my brother also has, 
and because there may be no exact literal words to 
explain those characteristics, I may rely on metaphor 
to express them. 
In such instances, metaphor may be necessary to 
the creation of terminology and be what Boyd (1979) 
calls "theory constitutive"; that is, metaphor not only 
defines the theory it represents, but also is not 
alternately expressable in literal terms. Such 
metaphors may hold their constitutive status for only a 
short time, until replacement by other "literal" 
language, or may maintain their status indefinitely; 
but, either way, they hold a vitally important function 
in scientific research. Two of Boyd's examples of 
theory constitutive metaphor are drawn from cognitive 
psychology, computer science and information theory: 
1) thought is a kind of information processing, 
and the brain is a sort of computer, and 
2) certain motoric or cognitive processes are 
preprogrammed. 
According to Boyd, computer metaphors seem to be 
especially useful to cognitive psychologists in 
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presenting their theories, and, for the moment at 
least, are the most concrete way of expressing them. 
For these writers of scientific discourse, then, 
metaphor is certainly more than mere ornament. 
Whether replaceable by literal language or theory 
constitutive, metaphor is has been established as a way 
of developing scientific terminology. 
Metaphor in Abstract Expression 
As well as helping to establish terminologies, 
metaphor facilitates abstract expression. The role of 
metaphor in abstract expression is best articulated by 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1981), a linguist and a 
psychologist, respectively, who maintain that metaphor 
is fundamental to the human conceptual system, which 
they break into nonmetaphorical and metaphorical 
categories. Nonmetaphorical concepts involve 1) 
spatial orientations (e.g., UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, NEAR-FAR), 
2) ontological concepts which come from physical 
experience (e.g., SUBSTANCE, CONTAINER, PERSON), and 3) 
structured experiences and activities e.g., EATING, 
MOVING). Lakoff and Johnson postulate that we use 
these nonmetaphorical concepts in a metaphorical manner 
to understand and communicate abstract notions. 
For example, one metaphorical notion which 
incorporates a nonmetaphorical concept is "more is up." 
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When we make a statement such as "you made a high 
number of mistakes," or "my income rose last year," we 
are using our nonmetaphorical, spatial orientation to 
say something about mistakes or income. It is as if we 
were able to stack the mistakes or the dollars from the 
ground up, so that more would make a higher stack and 
fewer would make a lower stack. It is equally common 
to say "the number of your errors is quite low," or "my 
income fell last year." 
Ontological metaphors, which give entity status to 
something which does not inherently have such status, 
also incorporate nonmetaphorical concepts. We might 
say "it's difficult to put my ideas into words," or 
"try to pack more thought into fewer words," indicating 
that we consider ideas as things or entities, and words 
as the containers for them. Another "container" for 
ideas is the mind. Consider such familiar sentences as 
"I can't get the tune out of my mind," "his brain is 
packed with interesting ideas," and "I need to clear my 
head." 
Another form of metaphor involves applying 
nonmetaphorical concepts of physical experience to 
nonphysical experience. We then apply these 
experiences to nonphysical experiences. When we say "I 
see what you mean" or "It looks different from my point 
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of view," we are not referring to a literal view, an 
actual physical experience, but we are expressing the 
similarity between our physical vision (seeing) and our 
mental vision (understanding). 
If we accept, as Lakoff and Johnson posit, that 
metaphor is essential for abstract expression, we must 
conclude that metaphor has an important place in 
scientific discourse, where abstract expression becomes 
essential to the communication of scientific concepts 
and principles. 
Metaphor in Hypothesis-building 
Metaphor is also essential to scientists for 
expanding their understanding of the universe, or of 
those things which they cannot, perhaps never will be 
able to, experience with their five senses, such as 
particle physics, or the cognitive characteristics of 
the human brain. It is as important for hypothesis-
building as it is for abstract expression. In fact, we 
can draw a direct correlation between hypothesis-
building and the processes by which psychologists say 
we expand our knowledge. 
Cognitive psychologists see metaphor and related 
devices as possible catalysts for assimilation and 
accommodation in the learning process. According to 
11 
developmental psychologist Claude Piaget, assimilation 
is the way in which environmental perceptions are 
incorporated into stable conceptual schemata. 
Accommodation is the change of the schemata themselves 
in response to perceptions and experiences. If 
metaphor is a catalyst for general knowledge 
acquisition, it is likely also a catalyst for the 
expansion of scientific knowledge where the processes 
of assimilation and accommodation undoubtedly also come 
into play. 
Boyd's atom-as-solar-system example (1979) 
illustrates the role of metaphor in assimilation and 
accommodation and in the development of a hypothsis. 
When physicist Niehls Bohr wanted to present his 
hypothesis of the appearance of an atom, he used a 
metaphor comparing the atom with the solar system. 
Bohr's perceptions of the atom were assimilated into 
his understanding of accepted natural principles, 
specifically of the solar system, resulting in a change 
in the stable conceptual schemata, or accepted 
theories, to accommodate the perception. 
The atom-as-solar-system theory is clearly 
metaphorical; it is based upon the comparison of two 
things in which the reader can immediately infer 
similarity--that is, between the tenor (the atom) and 
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the vehicle (the solar system). Using metaphor, Bohr 
could present his theory in a manner which, though it 
could have been alternately expressed in "literal" 
terms, was not only clear, but also succinct. In 
addition, the metaphoric association with an already 
established and accepted natural theory helped to 
support and develop the new theory. The lack of 
previous information on the makeup of atoms required 
that Bohr present his theory in terms of natural 
principles his colleagues had already conceptualized, 
and the atom/solar system analogy worked well for this 
purpose. Thus the atom/solar system analogy 
established by metaphor provided a basis for continued 
research, a useful concept for further communication, 
and a linguistic expression which not only succinctly 
and effectively identified the atom's nature but also 
influenced how we conceive of the atom to this day. 
Boyd (1979) posits that metaphor is "especially 
well suited to the introduction of terms referring to 
kinds whose real essences consist of complex relational 
properties, rather than features of internal 
constitution." The atom/solar system metaphor 
describes such complex relational properties, and 
provides a classic illustration of metaphor playing an 
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important role in the development and presentation of a 
scientific hypothesis. 
• 
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CONCERNS ABOUT METAPHOR IN SCIENCE 
Having discussed metaphor in scientific 
terminology, abstract expression, and hypothesis-
building, I will address two lingering concerns about 
using metaphor in science: 1) that it is difficult to 
understand, and 2) that it lacks "truthfulness" 
(Hoffman, 1980b}. 
The Cognitive Qualities of Metaphor 
Compared with literal language, metaphor is often 
thought more vague or ambiguous and difficult to 
understand (Harris, Lahey, and Marsalek, 1980}. Now 
individuals in the new discipline of cognitive science 
(which combines linguistics, philosophy, computer 
science, and psychology to study artificial and natural 
cognition} are studying metaphor to assess its 
cognitive qualities--how quickly, easily and accurately 
it is understood, how well it is remembered, and how 
much information it can carry. 
Psychologists believe that to comprehend metaphor 
readers must go through a two-step process, 1} deciding 
whether the passage is metaphorical, and 2} determining 
the meaning of the metaphor. First they must determine 
whether a passage is literal or metaphorical. After 
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reading a passage literally and failing to make sense 
of it, they reread it looking for a metaphorical 
interpretation. For example, because "a heated debate" 
is a semantic anomaly and a literal reading clashes 
with their knowledge of what is physically possible, 
they will interpret it as saying something non-literal 
about the debate. Some metaphors, of course, can be 
read literally, as in "the battle lines are drawn." 
Still, readers choose a metaphorical reading of the 
phrase when a literal one strikes them as irrelevant to 
the context. 
Second, they must ascertain the meaning of the 
metaphor. Plautus' metaphor "man is a wolf" is not 
taken to mean that man is literally a wolf, but is in 
some respect like a wolf--he is ruthless, or savage, or 
bent upon his individual survival over any other's. To 
determine the shared similarity between topic and 
vehicle as perceived by the writer, readers consider 
the context. For example, if I say "my brother is a 
rock," I could mean, among other things, either that 
he is firm and stable or that he is intellectually 
dense. The readers of the metaphor would have to 
interpret my intention based upon the context in which 
the statement is uttered. 
Even though metaphor is often considered more 
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difficult to understand and less effective for 
referential discourse than literal language, Richard 
Harris, Mary Anne Lahey, and Faith Marsalek (1980) have 
found no basis for these beliefs. These researchers 
used sets of three sentences: the first with an 
unusual metaphor, the second with a dead metaphor, and 
the third with a nonmetaphorical phrase. For example, 
a set might include "the ivy cuddled up to the window, 
the ivy crept up to the window, the ivy grew up to the 
window." Undergraduate psychology students at Kansas 
State University were asked to listen to a tape 
recording of these language sets, then respond to 
questions provided by the examiner. The researchers 
broke the results into three categories: 1) 
recognition memory, 2) imageability ratings, and 3) 
informativeness ratings. 
In the first category, recognition memory, the 
researchers found no significant difference in recall 
between the metaphorical and the nonmetaphorical 
sentences, thus indicating that metaphorical language 
is not inherently more difficult to understand and 
remember than literal language. 
For the second category, imageability ratings, the 
results showed no obvious correlation between metaphor 
and imagery; in other words, despite the fact that we 
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generally consider metaphors as image-producers and 
imagemaking an important mnemonic technique, 
imageability is not a good predictor of memorability. 
We may conclude, therefore, that the memorability of 
metaphor comes from something other than its power as 
an image-producer. 
In the third category, informativeness ratings, no 
significant difference was found between metaphorical 
and nonmetaphorical sentences in the amount of 
information they are able to convey. 
Evaluating the results from the above experiment 
and several others like it, Harris et al. conclude that 
metaphors are as easy as, if not more easy than, 
nonmetaphor to understand and remember, and they can 
carry as much information. The studies of Harris are 
supported by others, who also find no significant 
differences between literal and nonliteral material in 
either reading time, verification time, or correct 
recognition a short time after reading. 
Some metaphors are more easily understood and more 
effective than others, however. Just as some literal 
language is considered poor and some good, there are 
poor and good metaphors. Some studies have been 
conducted in an effort to determine what differentiates 
the two. 
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In one such study, conducted by Michael Johnson 
and Robert G. Malgady (1980, see also Malgady and 
Johnson, 1980), 28 metaphors and similies were taken 
from a breadth of literary sources and presented to 
college undergraduates to evaluate as "good" or "bad" 
based upon the student's own nonexpert criteria. The 
conclusion was that metaphors with a greater apparent 
similarity between topic and vehicle, e.g., "The snow 
this morning was like white confetti picked up by the 
wind," were considered easier to understand and more 
satisfying than those with a more opaque similarity, 
e.g., "Your smile was a warm wind." Perceived goodness 
was translated, then, into shared properties or 
features between tenor and vehicle. It is here that 
Roger Tourangeau (1982) also sees the separation 
between good metaphors and bad ones. He states, 
Among a host of other factors, agreement 
between the metaphor's picture and our own 
and incongruence between domains seems to 
contribute to our liking for a metaphor. 
Disagreement produces one sort of 
novelty--new beliefs--and incongruence 
another sort--a new structure for our 
beliefs"(l982). 
However, the shared similarities between tenor and 
vehicle must fall into a middle ground between 
"literalness" and "nonsense" to be understandable and 
19 
satisfying to the reader, according to a study done by 
Malgady (1975, cited in Malgady and Johnson, 1980). In 
other words, when comparing three levels of phrasing, 
"Robes are justice" (figurative), "Robes are garments" 
( 1 i teral), and "Robes are trucks" (nonsense), 
figurative judgements decrease as similarity increases 
or decreases away from the middle range. Phrases which 
are transparent or trite or far from the realm of 
possibility are less successful than those which make 
sense and provide a new insight. Johnson and Malgady 
(1980) summed up the link between recent studies by 
saying: 
A metaphor will be comprehensible (easy to 
interpret) to the extent that a relationship 
can be easily perceived between the topic and 
vehicle terms in the metaphor. 
Johnson and Malgady found that another 
characteristic of a satisfying metaphor is "richness," 
or the possibility of more than one interpretive 
possibility (1980). They point out that the quality of 
richness is consistent with the interactive view of 
metaphor, where new meanings, not just substitutions, 
are possibile. 
As a caution we should note that because serious 
scientific study of metaphor and its role in the 
cognitive process has only just begun, little can be 
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conclusively stated. Malgady and Johnson (1980) 
emphasize that theoretical asssumptions about metaphor 
are still sketchy, and argue that more discussion is 
needed to clear up three areas: 1) the lack of 
agreement on what comes under the domain of metaphor 
(there is little agreement in the academic community as 
to representative examples of metaphor), 2) lack of 
agreement on approaches to the study of metaphor, and 
3) the failure of experimental psychology to develop 
some hard facts on the subject, a matter which they say 
may be in the nature of the subject involved. Even 
with this in mind, however, results of the hypothesis 
testing which has been done supports the cognitive 
significance of metaphor. In fact, Johnson and Malgady 
(1980) state that, if anything, study has shown 
metaphor to have a central, rather than peripheral, 
role in the comprehension process. 
Just as scientists must carefully choose literal 
language to convey the intended meaning, so metaphor 
must be carefully fashioned to be effective. In light 
of these studies, there is no basis for the theoretical 
exclusion of metaphor from scientific discourse on the 
ground that it is difficult to understand. 
21 
The Truthfulness of Metaphor 
A final common objection to metaphor in science is 
that it does not provide the precision, objectivity and 
truthfulness required of scientific writing. To this 
one could ask two questions: 1) Is there is such a 
thing as linguistic precision and any way to avoid 
referential ambiguity? and 2) Do scientific theories 
represent the truth? 
In regard to the first question, Boyd (1979) 
suggests that if metaphor seems to be too imprecise for 
theory construction, we have a faulty view of the 
precision by which scientific referencing takes place. 
There are two major hypotheses on the manner in which 
reference is fixed in scientific and everyday 
discourse. Empirical theory states that most general 
terms are true by stipulation; the meanings are fixed 
in advance of their use. According to the opposing 
ostensive view, reference comes about by interaction 
between the users of the terms and the instances to 
which they belong. In empiricism, terms must be 
clearly and explicitly defined before use to avoid 
vagueness and imprecision--changes in theories almost 
always come from alterations in the subject matter or 
from the conceptual framework rather than from new 
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discoveries. The ostensive account, on the other hand, 
is that terms are fixed nondefinitially with 
accommodation taking place as more is discovered. Both 
approaches to referencing leave room for ambiguities. 
In empiricism, the terms are clearly defined but are 
of undetermined accuracy, and there is no accommodation 
for new discoveries. In ostension, the terms are 
nondefinitional, therefore ambiguous, but there is 
accommodation for new discoveries. 
Regarding the question of whether metaphor 
represents the truth, Hoffman (1980b) notes that 
scientists themselves will admit that theories are not 
really the TRUTH. Not that they are wrong, really, or 
they could be replaced by a more acceptable theory, but 
they are not entirely true, either. For example, the 
definition of a "quark" in physics as a "particle" is 
itself metaphorical because a quark has no spacial 
extension. When physicists speak of the constituents 
of a quark, they describe them as "pointlike 
(structureless)." And the movement attributed to 
quarks is again expressed metaphorically; quarks are 
said to "spin," even though the movement referred to is 
not a rotational one, but an "angular" momentum. 
It has been said that metaphor "masks" the truth. 
According to Hoffman (1980b), if metaphor masks the 
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truth it is because of "flabby theorizing" on the part 
of the researcher. If a researcher takes the metaphor 
too literally, it can hide the truth. For example, if 
the statement that elementary particles "feel" a force 
is taken to mean that they feel in ways similar to a 
human being, that is the fault of the researcher, who 
should use the metaphor heuristically rather than 
definitionally. If used properly, metaphor can be 
helpful in pointing the way to possible characteristics 
of the subject under study. 
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METAPHOR IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: A CASE STUDY 
The first part of this study has established 
metaphor as theoretically important to the development 
of scientific terminology, to the expression of 
abstract concepts, and to the processes of 
accommodation and assimilation in research. The second 
part will test these functions through a case study 
designed to discover how metaphor is used in a select 
area of scientific writing. 
Procedures: For the purposes of this study, 
"scientific terminology" refers to terms which have a 
meaning specific to science. "Abstract expression" 
refers to the articulation of scientific concepts or 
ideas. And "hypothesis" is a testable assumption. 
This case study itself is based on the August 15, 1985, 
issue of The Journal of Biological Chemistry, the 
publication of The American Society of Biological 
Chemists, Inc. Out of b8 scientific articles in this 
issue, I selected every tenth article, for a total of 
six articles. I then scanned each article for use of 
metaphor, noting the metaphors upon first encounter, 
then analyzing them according to the three functions 
established above. 
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Results: In the six articles, I identified these 22 
metaphors: 
The first article, 11 The Kinetic Equation for the 
Chloride Transport Cycle of Band 3," by Joseph J. 
Falke, Katherine J. Kanes, and Sunney I. Chan yielded 
1) A ping-pong model of the chloride 
transport cycle, 
2) leaky (red cell) ghosts, 
3) pulses (of rotation in a Waring blender), 
4) lower sensitivity of bacteria, and 
5) lifetime of chloride. 
The second article, "Turnover and Short-term Regulation 
of Fatty Acid Binding Protein in Liver," by Nathan M. 
Bass, Joan A. Manning, and Robert K. Ockner, yielded 
6) an abundant expression of this protein. 
The third article, "Inosine Analogs," by Stephen W. 
LaFon, Donald J. Nelson, Randolph L. Berens, and J. 
Joseph Marr, yielded no unrecorded metaphors. 
The fourth article, "Dependence of Maltose Transport 
and Chemotaxis on the Amount of Maltose-binding 
Protein," by Michael D. Manson, Winfried Boos, Philip 
J. Bassford, Jr. and Beth A. Rasmussen, yielded 
7) encoded by genes, 
8) the malT gene, mapping at 74 min, 
9) the cell envelope, 
10) membrane partners, 
11) cells were harvested, 
12) a toluene-based cocktail, and 
13) swarming behavior (of mutant bacteria). 
The fifth article, "Regulation of Epidermal Growth 
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Factor Receptor by Estrogen," by Venkat R. Mukku and 
George M. Stance!, yielded 
14) clockwise rotation of flagella, and 
15) protein may behave differently. 
And the sixth article, "Androgen Regulation of MAK 
mRNAs in Mouse Kidney," by Lauren D. Snider, Donna 
Kind, and Jerry B. Lingrel, yielded 
16) polypeptide chain, 
17) triggering the uterine growth, 
18) a stable cell population, 
19) a eDNA library, 
20) wells of microtiter dishes, 
21) colonies of bacteria, and 
22) library screening (of eDNA). 
Of these metaphors, some functioned in two or three 
capacities; for example, the term "ping-pong" transport 
cycle operates not only as a scientific term, but also 
as an abstract expression, and it aids in presenting 
and explaining a hypothesis as well. In sum, 15 of the 
metaphors functioned as scientific terminology, 16 
functioned as abstract expressions, and 4 in the 
presentation of hypotheses. Three acted in all three 
capacities, eight functioned in two capacities, and 
eleven served in only one. 
Discussion: Metaphor was indeed found helpful in all 
three capacities posited in the opening part of this 
study. The scientific terms based on metaphor were 
useful to researchers in the data, even though in many 
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cases the metaphorical wording could have been replaced 
by literal terms. For example, in Falke's article 
about how chloride moves in and out of cells (Falke et 
al, 1985), a ghost was the metaphorical expression for 
an emptied cell, which has a filmy look. Similarly, in 
Manson's article about the uptake of maltose (a sugar) 
in bacteria (Manson et al., 1985), a cell envelope was 
the term for the outer membrane of the cell, and a 
toluene-based cocktail for a solution containing 
toluene mixed with other chemicals. In Snider's 
article about how a male hormone regulates DNA 
transcription (Snider et al., 1985), wells of 
microtiter dishes are simply holes dug in the agar 
contained in a petrie dish. In each of these cases, 
the metaphor could have been replaced by literal 
language, but the metaphors shortened description 
necessary to the understanding of the scientist's 
meaning by fulfilling a catachretic role, providing a 
term where none before existed. However, in Manson's 
article, one term did prove to be theory constitutive. 
That term, encoding, as in encoding by genes, is, in 
fact, cited earlier in this study as an example of 
theory constitutive metaphor. 
Metaphor was also found in abstract expression in 
the data. For example, a eDNA library is a collection 
28 
of synthetically manufactured, or "copied," genetic 
materials. There are thousands of kinds of DNA genes 
in an animal, governing all characteristics, from basic 
body form to eye color, and a genetic laboratory 
utilizing modern molecular biology techniques will 
likely have a rather complete set of eDNA stored 
indefinitely in the chromosomes of growing bacteria, so 
that each kind of eDNA can be "checked out" when needed 
for experimentation, just as a well stocked book 
library will have a good number of books which can be 
checked out when desired. In another instance, 
expression of protein (Bass et al., 1985) draws an 
analogy with human speech. In a process termed 
"expression," some of the total genetic information in 
the nucleus of a cell directs the synthesis of protein 
molecules in the cell cytoplasm. Not all of the 
genetic material held in the nucleus is used to direct 
the synthesis of protein in the cytoplasm, just as not 
all thoughts in our mind are expressed through spoken 
words. Using the term lifetime of chloride (Bass et 
al., 1985), Bass refers to the length of time chloride 
is present at a particular site in the membrane of a 
cell. a correlation with the length of time human 
beings are present on earth. 
The value of metaphor in the presentation of a 
---·------------------------------
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hypothesis was especially apparent in the data in the 
term ping-pong transport cycle (Falke et al., 1985), 
used to describe an as yet unproven hypothesis of the 
pattern by which chloride passes in and out of a cell. 
In this instance the popular game of ping-pong provides 
a term for a biochemical process. According to the 
hypothesis, a protein within the cell wall 
metaphorically paddles the chloride back and forth 
across the membrane net. The ping-pong metaphor is 
useful for describing the process, and it may also help 
further the hypothesis, for it may point the way to 
analagous principles operating in purportedly analagous 
situations. In another two cases, metaphor may at one 
time have been helpful in presenting a hypothesis which 
the current articles assumed to have been established: 
1) bacteria grow in groups, or colonies (Snider et al., 
1985) and 2) polypeptide takes the linear form of a 
chain (Mukku and Stancel, 1985). Before anything was 
known about bacteria and polypeptide, these 
associations with known entities could have been 
helpful for visualizing and presenting a hypothesis 
which subsequently gained acceptance. 
While only the ping-pong metaphor was theory 
constitutive in the absolute sense, all the metaphors 
certainly were more than mere ornament in that they 
30 
provided for at least one, sometimes two or all three 
of the functions--terminology, abstract expression, and 
hypothesis-formation and presentation. 
This case study supports the theory that metaphor 
provides a way to express an idea which cannot be 
otherwise expressed. It provides for terms and abstract 
expressions, and it helps visualize, present, perhaps 
even form, hypotheses. 
Finally, my analysis of the data also indicated 
that the metaphors themselves often lose some of their 
power of analogy and take on a literal meaning through 
extended use. For example, when the term polypeptide 
chain (Mukku and Stance!, 1985) was first used fifty 
years ago, it probably helped scientists envision the 
shape of a polypeptide, something they could not see. 
Today, knowledgeable scientists no longer focus on the 
physical similarities between a neckchain and a 
polypeptide chain; the term has become less a 
description than a name. Thus, polypeptide chain has 
evolved from a figurative to a literal meaning. 
Furthermore, the study highlighted the degree of 
borrowing extant between scientific and nontechnical 
language. Ping-pong transport cycle (Falke et al., 
1985), cell ghosts (Falke et al., 1985), toluene-based 
cocktail (Manson et al., 1985), popypeptide chain 
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(Mukku and Stance!, 1985), triggering of uterine growth 
(Mukku and Stance!, 1985), and cell population (Snider 
et al., 1985) are all scientific terms rooted in non-
technical language. Possibly, heavily-used scientific 
terms which originated in nontechnical language will 
again migrate back into nontechnical usage, albeit with 
changes in meaning in accordance with changes in 
audience and aim of discourse. 
Thus, in addition to affirming the theoretical 
functions of metaphor presented earlier in the paper, 
the study suggests changes in it meanings at two 
levels. One change is between literal and figurative. 
Another is between nontechnical and scientific 
language. 
32 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
A thorough study should be done of metaphor in a 
cross-section of disciplines. By studying in depth and 
comparing metaphor in the physical, biological, and 
social sciences we can determine if a given discipline 
lends itself more frequently to metaphor and in what 
situations. Such a study would provide a basis for a 
much-needed taxonomy of scientific metaphor. For a 
model of such a taxonomy we might look to the work of 
Roland Bartel. 
In Metaphors and Symbols (1983), Bartel discusses 
the many kinds of metaphor there are in literature. 
This study provides a suggestion of the variety of 
metaphor which might be found in science writing. 
Popular metaphor, he says, includes riddles (e.g., the 
moon is a pumpkin in a meadow), folk expressions and 
proverbs (e.g., bring home the bacon), cliches (e.g., 
jump the gun), literal words (what we consider 
dictionary meanings often originated through 
metaphorical reference, e.g., a door is an entrance to 
a room; it is also an opportunity, for education or a 
career), and slang (e.g., eat's pajamas). Literal 
comparisons, such as "the explosion produced a crater 
seven football fields long and three football fields 
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deep," are metaphors. He distinguishes four kinds of 
metaphor in poetry: 1) causal metaphor, such as 
cliches and synesthetic metaphors (metaphors which mix 
sensory perceptions, such as "silent form," or "scarlet 
pain"), 2) sensuous metaphors which create a strong 
image, such as "a spider rappelling from the ceiling," 
3) resonant metaphors, which add implication to 
sensuousness, such as "undernourished children whose 
skins peeped through by bones," and 4) complex and 
subtle metaphors, which reflect multiple meanings, 
expressing depths of emotion, such as "the stunted, 
unlucky heir of twisted bones, reciting a father's 
gnarled disease" (from Spender's "An Elementary 
Classroom in the Slum"). 
In the sciences we often find exegetical or 
pedagogical metaphors which aid in the teaching or 
explication of theories, as, for example, such 
terminologies as "wormholes in general relativity," 
"electron cloud," and atoms as "miniature solar 
systems." 
An analysis of scientific metaphor would require 
an intensive and specialized, but potentially highly 
productive, study. It should show us how often, what 
kinds, and in what ways metaphor is used. 
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